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Some authors clearly showed that faking reduces the construct validity of personality 
questionnaires, whilst many others found no such effect. A possible explanation for mixed results 
could be searched for in a variety of methodological strategies in forming comparison groups 
supposed to differ in the level of faking: candidates vs. non-candidates; groups of individuals with 
"high" vs. "low" social desirability score; and groups given instructions to respond honestly vs. 
instructions to "fake good". All three strategies may be criticized for addressing the faking problem 
indirectly – assuming that comparison groups really differ in the level of response distortion, 
which might not be true. Therefore, in a within-subject design study we examined how faking 
affects the construct validity of personality inventories using a direct measure of faking. The 
results suggest that faking reduces the construct validity of personality questionnaires gradually – 
the effect was stronger in the subsample of participants who distorted their responses to a greater 
extent. 
 






After decades of research conducted in simulated and real selection contexts, it 
is now clear that people can distort their responses on personality scales and that 
applicants in personnel selection do that in order to present themselves in a positive 
light (e.g. Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2003; Galić & Jerneić, 2006; Mueller-
Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton III, 2003; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998). 
Further research has shown that, due to differences in ability and motivation to 
fake, not all people distort their answers to the same extent (Griffith, Chmielowski, 
& Yoshita, 2007; Jerneić et al., 2010; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999). Hence, 
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individual differences in faking could contaminate personality scores and distort the 
personality-based rank order of applicants – "people who inflate scores by even a 
moderate degree can displace honest candidates at the top of the pool" (Kim, 2011, 
p. 258). Consequences of this distortion are lower quality personnel decisions 
(Rosse et al., 1998; Stewart, Darnold, Zimmerman, Parks, & Dustin, 2010), and 
potentially a decrease of personality inventory properties such as construct and 
criterion validity (e.g. Tett & Christiansen, 2007).  
The present study focuses on the effect of faking on the construct validity of 
personality questionnaires. This issue was investigated in numerous studies 
typically comparing personality inventory responses of those responding honestly 
with those faking (Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 2001). However, studies have been 
yielding contradictory results. In some, the construct validity was preserved (e.g. 
Ellingson et al., 2001; Henry & Raju, 2006; Marshall, De Fruyt, Rolland, & Bagby, 
2005; Robie, Zickar, & Schmit, 2001) whilst in others it was seriously affected (e.g. 
Biderman & Nguyen, 2006; Schmit & Ryan, 1993; Zickar & Robie, 1999). A 
possible explanation for mixed findings could be searched for in the shortcomings 
of methodological strategies in forming comparative groups which are supposed to 
differ in the level of response distortion.  
Three main comparison strategies can be identified in previous studies. One 
strategy was to compare job applicants' responses to those of incumbents (Marshall 
et al., 2005; Smith, Hanges, & Dickson, 2001; Weekley, Ployhart, & Harold, 2004), 
or of other non-applicants, such as students (Schmit & Ryan, 1993; Smith & 
Ellingson, 2002; Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow, 2001). However, 
studies comparing these naturally occurring groups yielded inconsistent results. For 
example, Schmit and Ryan (1993) examined students' and applicants' responses on 
NEO-FFI and found that the five-factor structure fit the students' responses but not 
the applicants' responses. A six-factor model, with additional "ideal employee 
factor", fit the applicant data significantly better. On the other hand, Smith et al. 
(2001), comparing the NEO PI-R structure between job applicants, job incumbents 
and students, found that faking did not reduce the construct validity of personality 
questionnaires - the NEO PI-R factor structure remained stable across all samples. 
Such inconsistent findings regarding the effects of faking on construct validity of 
personality questionnaires could be attributed to the wrong assumption that all 
applicants fake, as well as that incumbents and other non-applicants do not. 
Incumbents could also be motivated to present themselves in a more favorable 
light, in order to get a promotion or some other benefit. In addition, they represent a 
preselected population in respect to their personality and abilities, thus the level of 
response distortion might not be the only relevant difference between the two 
comparison groups. 
Another approach was to split a sample into "high"- and "low"-fakers groups 
on the basis of social desirability scale scores. For example, Henry and Raju (2006) 
examined the item-level and scale-level responses on six empirically-derived facets 
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of conscientiousness from the California Psychological Inventory between "high" 
and "low" social desirability groups. Measurement equivalence across the two 
groups was tested by using the Item response theory based DFIT (differential 
functioning of items and tests) framework. Since analyses revealed that DFIT was 
present in negligible amount, Henry and Raju concluded that faking did not affect 
the construct validity of personality questionnaires. The same conclusion was 
drawn in many other studies using scores on a socially desirable responding scale 
as a basis for comparison groups formation (Ellingson et al., 2001; Flanagan & 
Raju, 1997; Marshall et al., 2005; Stark et al., 2001). However, Griffith and 
Peterson (2008) argued that using social desirability scores in studies on effects of 
faking was not valid, because "…little empirical evidence had supported the 
linkage between social desirability measures and actual faking behavior" (p. 308). 
For example, Galić and Jerneić (in press) concluded that at the individual level 
social desirability scores did not represent a good measure of faking, and Ellingson, 
Sackett and Hough (1999) showed that a social desirability-based correction of 
faked results failed to produce a corrected score that approximated an honest score.  
The third, and perhaps the most common, strategy in forming comparison 
groups was to manipulate instruction sets using either between- (Douglas, 
McDaniel, & Snell; 1996; Griffith, 1997) or within-group designs (Ellingson et al., 
1999). Regularly, the baseline instruction set was instructing participants to 
"respond honestly", while response distortion was encouraged by instructions to 
"fake good", i.e. present themselves as an extremely virtuous person (Douglas et 
al., 1996; Griffith, 1997; Pauls & Crost, 2005). This strategy was used by Biderman 
and Nguyen (2006) when modeling faking via structural equations models. The 
results strongly suggested that response tendencies that might be best characterized 
as faking changed the factor structure of the test scores completed under "fake-
good" conditions. The main critique of this approach is that response distortion 
elicited by instructions does not reflect the real-life applicants' faking. Real-life 
applicants might fake their responses only on the personality dimensions relevant 
for the specific job (Martin, Bowen, & Hunt, 2002; Pauls & Crost, 2005), 
compared to raising their results on the whole inventory when instructed to "fake 
good". 
Taken together, all three strategies can be criticized for addressing the faking 
problem indirectly, only assuming that comparative groups really differ in the level 
of response distortion. This inference might not be justified. Two respondents can 
be tested in different conditions (selection vs. non-selection), have unequal social 
desirability scale results ("high" vs. "low"), as well as having been given different 
instructions ("respond honestly" vs. "fake-good"), and still distort answers to the 
same extent. Thus, the aim of the present study was to examine how faking affects 
the construct validity of personality inventories using a direct measure of faking. 
We calculated the direct measure of faking as an individual difference score 
between two different instructional sets in the within-group research design. One 
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instructional set was designed to elicit as little distortion as possible ("honest" 
responses), while the other instructional set was designed to elicit distortion 
comparable to that in selection situations. To make the faking condition more 
realistic, we used simulated selection instead of "fake-good" instructions. 
Accordingly, participants responded to a personality questionnaire twice – the first 
time they were asked to respond honestly and the second time to respond imagining 
that they were in a process of a specific selection program. The difference between 
scores on the personality questionnaire, filled in by the same respondent on two 
occasions, directly represented the individual amount of faking. This was not the 
first time in faking literature that the difference score was used to represent faking. 
It had been used in several studies on determinants of faking behavior (e.g. 
McFarland & Ryan, 2000). However, as far as we know, difference scores had 
never been used when exploring the effect of faking on construct validity. Thus, the 
novelty of this research is a comparison of personality responses of empirically 
detected "high"-fakers and "low"-fakers, instead of comparing groups only 
supposing to differ in the level of response distortion. 
In order to test the effect of faking on the construct validity of personality 
questionnaires, we examined the factorial validity of the Five-factor model 
inventory IPIP-300 (International Personality Item Pool, Goldberg et al., 2006) by 
comparing the factor structure of its facets in groups and contexts in which the 
degree of faking varied. Based on the findings of some previous research on the 
effect of faking on factorial validity of personality questionnaires (Biderman & 
Nguyen, 2006; Cellar, Miller, Doverspike, & Klawsky, 1996; Ellingson et al., 
1999; Schmit & Ryan, 1993; Ziegler & Buehner, 2009), we put forward the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. Factorial validity in simulated selection condition will be reduced 
compared to factorial validity of the same personality questionnaire in 
condition when participants were instructed to respond honestly. The factor 
structure distortion will be manifested in a different arrangement of factor 
loadings, in comparison to the expected structure of five factors loading on 
their lower-ordered theoretically corresponding facets. 
Hypothesis 2. The effect of factor structure distortion will be more pronounced in 
the subsample of participants who faked their responses to a greater extent. 
Thus, we expect that in "Applicant" condition the theoretical Five-factor 
model structure will be more distorted in the "High"-fakers subsample than in 










Participants were 412 students (91% of the sample) and newly graduated 
alumni (9%) of the University of Zagreb, Croatia. Participants' age ranged from 18 
to 30 years, averaging 23.0 (SD=2.17); 56% of the sample was female. Psychology 
students and alumni were excluded. 
 
Measures and Procedures 
 
We used the Croatian translation of Goldberg's IPIP-300 questionnaire 
(Jerneić, Galić, & Parmač, 2007) to measure five personality dimensions: 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Every 
personality dimension consists of six facets (see Table 2 for the list of facets), 
which were represented with 10 items each. Responses were made on a 7-point 
scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Participants anonymously 
responded to the IPIP-300 twice. The first time they were asked to respond honestly 
while the second time they were instructed to respond to the questionnaire as if they 
were in the process of a specific student scholarship selection program – a random 
half of the participants were imagining a selection for an abundant financial grant 
and the other half a selection for an attractive free student educational excursion. 
Since we found no differences in factor structures of responses collected under 
different programs, the data from both simulated selection programs were merged 
together to form "Applicant" condition.  
Scale reliabilities of all five dimensions were high, with Alpha coefficients 
varying between .88 for Openness and .94 for Conscientiousness in "Honest" 
condition, and between .86 and .96 for the same two traits in "Applicant" condition. 
At the subscale level, most facets showed acceptable levels of internal consistency 
(>.70) across conditions. Only for Self-consciousness in both conditions (.59 and 
.52, respectively), and Activity (.55) and Openness to Values (.59) in "Applicant" 
condition, Alpha coefficients below .60 were obtained. 
 
Statistical Methods and Analyses 
 
Since we were interested in examining differential effects of the intensity of 
faking on factor structure of personality questionnaire, we divided participants into 
two subsamples according to the individual levels of faking. The faking score for 
each individual was calculated as the difference between personality scores in "fake 
good" and honest conditions. To get only one measure of faking, we summed up 
the absolute values of scale differences on five dimensions. The internal 
consistency of this composite measure was .69. Based on the median difference 
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score, the sample was split into groups of "Low"- (N=207) and "High"-fakers 
(N=205).  
The effects of faking were tested by a series of exploratory factor analyses. 
The choice of exploratory factor analysis over the confirmatory factor analysis was 
based on the previous research conclusions that confirmatory factor analysis seems 
to be too restrictive in testing the Five-factor model of personality (Borkenau & 
Ostendorf, 1990; Church & Burke, 1994, McCrae, Zonderman, Costa, Bond, & 
Paunonen, 1996). The exploratory analyses were conducted on both subsamples for 
each condition separately. The principal axis factor method (with varimax rotation) 
was applied to 30 facets by restricting the number of factors to five. We decided to 
fix the number of factors to five because of the Five-factor model background of 
the IPIP-300, which was in previous research empirically shown to be robust with 
respect to testing context (e.g. Johnson, 2005; McCrae et al., 1996). Another reason 
for fixing the number of factors was to enable a direct comparison of the similarity 
between factor structures as well as factors extracted in different subsamples and 
conditions, by using Tucker's (1951) congruence coefficients (rc). We chose to 
factorize the facets instead of questionnaire items, because facets, as more reliable 





Group Mean Differences 
 
In order to evaluate the effects of faking instructions, we computed descriptive 
statistics for "Honest" and "Applicant" conditions (Table 1). In both subsamples, 
the mean scores on Neuroticism in the "Applicant" conditions were lower 
compared to "Honest" condition, while means of other dimensions were generally 
higher compared to "Honest" condition. These results showed that in the 
"Applicant" condition, participants distorted their results in the socially desirable 
direction. The average effect sizes (d-indices, Cohen, 1988) were found in both 
subsamples – 0.97 in the "Low"-fakers subsample and 2.30 in the "High"-fakers 
subsample. Even though the average effect size was more than one standard 
deviation larger for "High"-fakers, the pattern of d-indices remained the same as in 
the "Low"-fakers subsample, with scores on Conscientiousness and Neuroticism 
being the most distorted. Within both groups, the pattern of results was similar to 
meta-analysis of fakability estimates (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999) – the largest 
effect sizes were observed on Neuroticism and Conscientiousness and the lowest on 
Agreeableness and Openness.  
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations and Effect Sizes for IPIP Dimensions, for Subsamples 






















M SD M SD Cohen's d M SD M SD Cohen's d 
Neuroticism 202.7 37.89 146.6 35.70 1.52 232.9 39.49 121.5 23.12 3.44 
Extraversion 291.3 34.01 325.2 30.29 -1.05 268.0 37.18 341.3 25.24 -2.31 
Openness 301.0 32.41 309.5 29.00 -0.28 296.9 36.10 314.7 26.31 -0.56 
Agreeableness 302.2 30.82 311.8 32.18 -0.30 288.1 35.55 320.2 31.59 -0.95 





Following the procedure explained in the Method section, we first factor-
analyzed the facets scores in "Honest" condition by fixing the number of factors to 
five. The expected five factor solution was supported by the Scree test (Cattell, 
1966) and parallel analysis (Horn, 1965). Tucker's congruence coefficient values of 
.95 and higher indicated that the five factors extracted on "Low"-fakers were highly 
similar to the corresponding five factors on the "High"-fakers subsample. 
Therefore, in this condition we merged the two subsamples and performed factor-
analysis on the whole sample. The extracted factors explained 7-14% (cumulative 
58%) of the total variance of facets scores (Table 2). The factor loadings suggested 
that the five-factor structure of the IPIP-300 was reproduced. Even though the 
simple structure, as expected by the Five-factor model of personality, was not 
found, the amount of cross-loadings was comparable to those found in other factor-
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Table 2. Results of Factor Analysis of IPIP-300 Facets in "Honest" Condition  
("Low"- and "High"-Fakers Together) (N=412) 
 
Scale Factor h2 N E O A C 
N1 Anxiety .88 -.25 -.03 .01 -.04 .83 
N2 Angry Hostility .72 -.09 -.07 -.30 .14 .64 
N3 Depression .60 -.42 .15 -.12 -.22 .62 
N4 Self-Consciousness .61 -.33 -.11 .26 -.41 .73 
N5 Impulsiveness .39 .23 .14 -.51 -.25 .55 
N6 Vulnerability .82 -.02 -.03 .01 -.27 .75 
E1 Warmth -.13 .81 .01 .08 .30 .76 
E2 Gregariousness -.04 .73 -.02 -.01 .20 .58 
E3 Assertiveness -.10 .37 .14 -.21 .66 .65 
E4 Activity -.01 .18 -.00 .01 .69 .50 
E5 Excitement-Seeking -.14 .37 .37 -.35 -.05 .42 
E6 Positive Emotions -.18 .73 .08 .02 .18 .61 
O1 Fantasy .37 .09 .51 -.10 -.07 .42 
O2 Aesthetics .16 .24 .45 .40 .15 .47 
O3 Feelings .47 .20 .50 .21 .20 .60 
O4 Actions -.32 .27 .50 .01 .15 .45 
O5 Ideas -.12 .00 .56 .00 .42 .51 
O6 Values -.05 -.13 .47 -.04 -.13 .26 
A1 Trust -.16 .54 .11 .33 -.06 .44 
A2 Straightforwardness -.01 .07 .02 .76 .05 .59 
A3 Altruism .05 .51 .21 .58 .22 .70 
A4 Compliance -.22 .13 .00 .73 -.23 .65 
A5 Modesty .11 -.23 -.06 .45 -.40 .44 
A6 Tender-Mindedness .14 .29 .27 .61 .01 .56 
C1 Competence -.41 .15 .12 .07 .70 .70 
C2 Order .10 -.00 -.21 .39 .39 .36 
C3 Dutifulness -.12 .05 -.13 .74 .34 .70 
C4 Achievement Striving  .00 .11 .08 .18 .77 .65 
C5 Self-Discipline -.16 .14 -.07 .37 .71 .69 
C6 Deliberation -.20 -.23 -.20 .53 .41 .59 
% of Explained Variance 12.70 11.60   6.60 13.80 13.40 58.00 
Note. These are Varimax-rotated principal axes, extracted when the number of factors was fixed  
to  5.  Loadings  greater  than .30  in absolute magnitude are in boldface. N = Neuroticism; E = 
Extraversion; O = Openness; A = Agreeableness; C = Conscientiousness; h2 = Communalities. 
 
In the next step we factor-analyzed the facets scores in the "Applicant" 
condition for each subsample separately (Table 3). To have a comparable number 
of factors with the "Honest" condition, we retained the five factors albeit results of 
parallel analysis and scree plot suggested discarding the fifth factor in both 
subsamples. In the subsample of "Low"-fakers, five extracted factors explained 
65% of the total variance of 30 IPIP facets – seven percent more than in the 
"Honest" condition. Further, in this condition the amount of variance explained by 
each factor (4-21%) varied more. Factor matrix with a greater number of cross-
loadings revealed that a more complex solution was produced, compared to the five 
factor structure in the "Honest" condition (Table 2).  
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Table 3. Results of Factor Analysis of IPIP-300 Facets for "Low"-Fakers (N=207)  




Factor   h2 Factor   h2 1L 2L 3L 4L 5L 1H 2H 3H 4H 5H 
N1 Anxiety -.34 -.20 .76 -.22 .06 .78 -.41 -.27 -.45 .28 .11 .54 
N2 Angry/ 
Hostility -.21 -.29 .67 -.07 .05 .58 -.33 -.37 -.19 .38 -.10 .43 
N3 Depression -.41 -.40 .57 -.20 .13 .70 -.67 -.24 -.33 .14 -.04 .63 
N4 Self-
Consciousness -.41 -.04 .71 -.14 -.03 .69 -.50 .05 -.36 .14 .03 .40 
N5 Impulsiveness -.52 -.26 .45 .26 .12 .63 -.47 -.36 -.02 .40 -.09 .52 
N6 Vulnerability -.55 -.06 .72 -.01 -.00 .82 -.62 -.01 -.23 .37 -.01 .57 
E1 Warmth .33 .66 -.27 .41 -.04 .76 .22 .56 .61 .02 -.00 .73 
E2 Gregariousness .24 .45 -.29 .53 .03 .62 .14 .27 .68 .06 .09 .57 
E3 Assertiveness .71 .04 -.26 .30 .05 .67 .57 -.18 .34 .16 .10 .51 
E4 Activity .63 -.11 -.26 -.09 -.06 .49 .47 -.15 .03 -.21 .44 .48 
E5 Excitement-
Seeking -.06 .04 -.11 .58 .14 .37 -.10 -.23 .70 .30 -.09 .65 
E6 Positive 
Emotions .20 .58 -.15 .59 .06 .75 .17 .23 .61 .32 -.06 .56 
O1 Fantasy -.06 .18 .32 .34 .48 .48 -.18 -.01 .23 .72 -.05 .61 
O2 Aesthetics .27 .59 -.03 .25 .15 .50 .26 .38 .53 .23 .12 .56 
O3 Feelings .07 .48 .32 .18 .53 .65 -.03 .24 .21 .72 .06 .63 
O4 Actions .28 .34 -.48 .26 .17 .53 .22 .19 .59 -.08 .20 .48 
O5 Ideas .53 .32 -.34 .16 .40 .68 .45 .17 .38 .17 .32 .50 
O6 Values -.23 .04 -.08 .02 .44 .25 -.37 .13 .26 -.00 .26 .28 
A1 Trust .00 .71 -.22 .17 .13 .60 .11 .57 .31 .08 .01 .44 
A2 Straight-
forwardness .24 .75 -.14 -.19 -.06 .67 .11 .72 .10 -.08 .04 .55 
A3 Altruism .27 .81 -.14 .18 .18 .81 .23 .63 .42 .17 .13 .68 
A4 Compliance -.02 .76 -.21 -.06 -.07 .63 -.07 .77 .01 -.04 -.32 .71 
A5 Modesty -.50 .26 .06 -.33 .02 .43 -.44 .49 -.31 -.03 .13 .54 
A6 Tender-
Mindedness -.13 .71 .04 .06 .36 .65 -.16 .67 .16 .23 .35 .67 
C1 Competence .76 .23 -.40 .10 -.00 .80 .73 .10 .29 -.02 -.03 .63 
C2 Order .71 .29 -.03 -.02 -.27 .66 .74 .06 -.08 -.03 -.14 .58 
C3 Dutifulness .58 .65 -.27 -.02 -.06 .83 .48 .63 .11 .02 -.08 .64 
C4 Achievement/ 
Striving  .80 .19 -.27 .11 -.08 .77 .66 .02 .08 -.05 .17 .47 
C5 Self-Discipline .80 .24 -.34 .09 -.08 .82 .76 .26 .15 -.06 .10 .68 
C6 Deliberation .73 .34 -.26 -.15 -.07 .74 .66 .34 -.05 -.17 .07 .58 
% of Explained 
Variance 21.00 19.30 13.60  6.60  4.20 64.60 19.20 14.50 12.70  7.00  2.70 56.00 
 
Note. These are Varimax-rotated principal axes, extracted when the number of factors was fixed to 5. 
Loadings greater than .30 in absolute magnitude are in boldface.  N = Neuroticism; E = Extraversion; O 
= Openness; A = Agreeableness; C = Conscientiousness; h2 = Communalities. 
 
The first extracted factor in the "Low"-fakers subsample showed good 
similarity to Conscientiousness in the "Honest" condition (rc=.96; Table 4). Also, it 
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saturated Extraversion and Neuroticism facets which showed the greatest response 
distortion effect. The second factor resembled the Agreeableness factor the most, 
but Tucker's congruence coefficient was below .85, which is considered a threshold 
for fair similarity (Lorenzo-Seva & ten Berge, 2006). Based on factor loadings, the 
third factor most resembled Neuroticism from honest responding condition, 
although the congruence coefficient value of .93 indicated that similarity was only 
moderate. The remaining two factors, with only seven and four percent of 
explained variance, were most similar to Extraversion and Openness, respectively. 
Even though the fifth factor was not supported by parallel analysis, the congruence 
coefficient of both factors reached the threshold of fair similarity with factors 
extracted in the "Honest" condition. The total matrix congruence coefficient, 
comparing similarity between whole matrices (McCrae et al., 1996) equaled .89, 
which indicated only fair similarity. Hence, in the subsample of "Low"-fakers we 
confirmed our first hypothesis – faking in the "Applicant" condition to a certain 
degree changed the construct validity of IPIP-300 inventory. 
 
Table 4. Tucker’s Congruence Coefficients Expressing Correlations 
between Factors Extracted in "Honest" (N=412) and 
"Applicant" Condition in "Low"-Fakers Subsample (N=207) 
 
 "Applicant" Condition 
1L 2L 3L 4L 5L 
"Honest" 
Condition 
N -.51 -.24 .93 -.20 .25 
E .39 .66 -.46 .85 .22 
O .08 .36 -.09 .54 .89 
A .38 .80 -.27 -.15 -.01 
C .96 .36 -.58 .34 -.03 
Note. L = Low fakers; N = Neuroticism; E = Extraversion; O = Openness; A = Agreeableness; 
C = Conscientiousness. The highest values for each of the factors extracted in "Applicant" 
condition are in boldface. 
 
In the subsample of "High"-fakers, the five extracted factors in the "Applicant" 
condition explained 56% of IPIP-300 facets variance, almost the same amount as in 
the "Honest" condition (58%). Similarly to the subsample of "Low"-fakers in the 
same condition, the first factor explained much more variance (19%) than the fifth 
(3%). The pattern of factor loadings (Table 3) did not resemble the five-factor 
structure found in the "Honest" condition (Table 2). Indeed, the matrix of Tucker's 
coefficients did not reveal clear comparative factors (Table 5).  
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Table 5. Tucker’s Congruence Coefficients Expressing Correlations  
between Factors Extracted in "Honest" (N=412) and  
"Applicant" Condition in "High"-Fakers Subsample (N=205) 
 
 "Applicant" Condition 
1H 2H 3H 4H 5H 
"Honest" 
Condition 
N -.61 -.26 -.44 .63 .01 
E .38 .46 .86 .29 .14 
O -.01 .20 .61 .59 .44 
A .35 .89 .12 -.07 .16 
C .89 .18 .46 -.06 .40 
Note. H = High fakers; N = Neuroticism; E = Extraversion; O = Openness; A = Agreeableness;  
C = Conscientiousness. The highest values for each of the factors extracted in "Applicant" 
condition are in boldface. 
 
Factor 1 in the "Applicant" condition was the most similar factor (.89) to 
Conscientiousness in the "Honest" condition. Nevertheless, it was more similar 
(.98) to Factor 1 in the "Low"-fakers subsample in the "Applicant" condition, with 
almost the same pattern of factor loadings. It saturated all the Conscientiousness 
facets and negatively Neuroticism facets, together with Assertiveness, Activity, 
Openness to Ideas, and negatively Modesty. Factors 2 and 3 were most similar to 
Agreeableness (.89) and Extraversion (.86) factors in the "Honest" condition, 
respectively. Again, these factors were, in absolute terms, more similar to factors in 
the "Low"-fakers subsample in the "Applicant" condition: Factor 2 (.94) and Factor 
4 (.89), respectively. Finally, the remaining two extracted factors could not be 
clearly interpreted, having saturated too few facets. The fourth factor saturated 
Openness to Feelings and Fantasy, and Impulsiveness, while the rejected fifth 
factor saturated Activity only. The deviation from the five-factor structure found in 
the "Honest" condition was clearly evidenced by the fact that Neuroticism and 
Openness factors did not reproduce. In addition, the total congruence coefficient, 
comparing similarity between factor matrices in "Honest" and "Applicant" 
conditions in the "High"-fakers subsample, equaled .75. This value was lower than 
the congruence coefficient value in the "Low"-fakers subsample (.89), and, in 
absolute terms, below the threshold of fair similarity. From these results we 
concluded not only that the factorial validity in the "Applicant" condition in the 
subsample of "High"-fakers was reduced, but also that this effect was greater 
compared to the effect in the subsample of "Low"-fakers. This finding confirmed 








In order to examine whether faking reduces the factorial validity of the 
personality questionnaire, we compared its factor structure in subsamples and 
conditions in which the degree of faking varied. We had hypothesized that factorial 
validity of a personality questionnaire in a simulated selection condition would be 
reduced in comparison to the condition when participants were instructed to 
respond honestly. In addition, we expected that distortion would be more 
pronounced in the subsample of participants who faked their responses to a greater 
extent. A within-subjects design enabled us to calculate a direct measure of faking, 
as a difference between scores on the same personality questionnaire filled in by the 
same respondent in simulated selection and honest conditions. The results of our 
analyses revealed that faking reduced the construct validity of the personality 
questionnaire. Moreover, the effect was stronger in the subsample of participants 
who faked their responses to a greater extent ("High"-fakers) in comparison to the 
"Low" fakers group. This was evident from two findings: first, within the "High"-
fakers subsample there were more cross-loadings, resulting in some factors not 
being interpretable, and second, in the same subsample, Tucker's congruence 
coefficients showed that the factors structure was less similar to the expected five-
factor structure. 
The finding that faking changes the construct validity of personality 
questionnaires is inconsistent with some previous investigations examining the 
invariance of personality inventories factor structure in honest and faking 
conditions that showed that the factor structure was preserved in faking conditions 
(e.g. Ellingson et al., 2001; Henry & Raju, 2006; Marshall et al., 2005; Robie et al., 
2001). However, in these studies the formation of comparison groups was based on 
indirect indicators of faking: social desirability scale scores, membership in certain 
groups (job applicants, incumbents, or other non-applicants), or motivational 
context (instruction to respond honestly or "fake-good"). The limitation of these 
strategies is the assumption that comparative groups really differ in the level of 
faking, which might not be true. For this reason, we introduced a strategy of 
forming comparison groups based on a direct measure of faking.  
In our study, the baseline factor structure was the one found in the condition 
when participants were instructed to respond honestly. As expected, the factor-
analyses of personality facets in this condition replicated a Five-factor model 
structure of the IPIP-300 questionnaire. However, the same analyses in simulated 
selection program revealed that the five-factor structure had been distorted. Even 
though the Tucker's congruence coefficients showed that some factors were similar 
to the five personality factors, the pattern of factor loadings offered potential 
alternative interpretations. In both "High"- and "Low"-fakers subsamples, the two 
largest factors might be seen as social desirability factors. The first described a 
competent, dominant, emotionally stable and intellectual person, resembling factors 
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known in literature as "ideal-employee factor" (Schmit & Ryan, 1993), "agentic 
factor" (Wiggins & Trapnell, 1996) and "egoistic bias" (Paulhus, 2002). The 
second factor described an agreeable, warm and reliable person, which are 
characteristics of "Factor β" (Digman, 1997), "communal" factor (Wiggins & 
Trapnell, 1996) and "moralistic bias" (Paulhus, 2002). The finding that parallel 
analysis and scree test suggested retaining only four factors is in line with evidence 
that faking inflates the inter-correlations among trait dimensions (Pauls & Crost, 
2005; Ziegler & Buehner, 2009), which often results in the extraction of fewer, 
social desirability, factors when compared to honest responders (Douglas et al., 
1996; Ellingson et al., 1999). 
The methodology of using instructions to experimentally induce faking 
behavior was often criticized for resulting in more response distortion in 
comparison to actual selection context, where job applicants fake more cautiously 
to prevent getting caught. In order to overcome this limitation and create a response 
set that is representative of the mind sets of actual applicants (Biderman & Nguyen, 
2006), we used simulated selection instead of commonly used "fake-good" 
instructions. Furthermore, by dividing the sample based on the amount of faking, 
we managed to isolate "low"-fakers who distorted their answers to a lesser extent, 
potentially comparable to that obtained on actual applicants. Our results clearly 
showed that even relatively low amount of faking could reduce the construct 
validity of personality questionnaires. However, it is still possible that responses 
collected in a natural environment, such as an actual applicant condition, would 
yield different results. In order to enhance the external validity, i.e. generalizability 
of the present findings, future studies should consider replication of this research in 
other samples and conditions. Specifically, future research might compare 
responses collected in a condition where participants are actual selection candidates 
to the condition where selection program is simulated. The most challenging aspect 
of such within-subject research would be getting applicants' honest responses. Also, 
it would be interesting to examine potential moderator variables such as job need or 
desire, which could raise applicants' motivation to fake and therefore impact the 
effect on construct validity changes. In selection situations which elicit more 
motivation to fake (e.g. attractive job position), we would expect a more severe 
decrease in validity, compared to situations which elicit less motivation to fake and 
consequently less faking behavior.  
In addition, it should be noted that all participants responded to the IPIP-300 
twice and in the same order: the first time participants were asked to respond 
honestly while the second time they were instructed to respond to the questionnaire 
as if they were in the process of a specific student scholarship selection program. 
Hence, it might be questionable whether the effects could be attributed only to 
manipulation of the experimental condition and not to the order of the conditions. 
However, we believe that our conclusions regarding differences between honest 
responding and experimentally induced faking situations are valid. This is because 
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the condition effect sizes (see Table 1 for Cohen d-values) on personality scales 
were robust in our analyses and are very well documented in the literature for 
within- and between-subject designs (e.g., Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). Moreover, 
the order effect, if any, would be a small one and substantially outperformed by the 
condition effect size (Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990). 
This study has a strong implication for the personnel selection practice. The 
finding that faking reduces the construct validity of the IPIP-300 personality 
questionnaire suggests that the Five-factor personality model may not fit applicant 
population responses as well as it fits honest responses. In support of this, there are 
many studies carried out in actual selection contexts that have found distorted 
construct validity of personality measures in applicants' samples (e.g. Cellar et al., 
1996; Cox, 2010; Schmit & Ryan, 1993; Stark et al., 2001; Weekley et al., 2004). 
In addition, our results imply that the more the applicants fake, the more severe the 
decrease in construct validity could be. The most straightforward implication of our 
research is the awareness that by using the Five-factor model inventories in 
personnel selection context we might not measure constructs we intend to. Thus, 
descriptions of candidates' personality based on dimensions scale scores might not 
represent the degree to which individuals actually possess the personality traits 
being measured (Ellingson et al., 2001). To prevent lower quality personnel 
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